報告題目：A dual-signaling mechanism with distracted consumers
報 告 人：陳靜教授
報告時間：11月6日 14:30-16:30
報告地點：成都校區(qū)博學(xué)樓B401、南充校區(qū)完井樓401（線上）
報告人簡介：
陳靜，加拿大Dalhousie University管理學(xué)院管理科學(xué)與信息系統(tǒng)系講席教授（William A. Black Chair in Commerce），2008畢業(yè)于加拿大University of Western Ontario毅偉商學(xué)院，獲管理科學(xué)博士學(xué)位。目前，她擔(dān)任了運營管理領(lǐng)域國際權(quán)威期刊OMEGA、JORS、ITOR等副主編，是加拿大人文與社會科學(xué)聯(lián)合會董事會成員（Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences in Canada）。陳靜老師的研究興趣包括渠道競爭與供應(yīng)鏈管理、運營管理與營銷交叉研究、顧客退貨管理等，目前已在相關(guān)領(lǐng)域國際權(quán)威期刊Journal of Retailing、Decision Sciences、EJOR、NRL、OMEGA等發(fā)表論文90余篇，同時她在全球頂尖案例庫IVEY Publishing發(fā)表了教學(xué)案例22篇。
報告內(nèi)容摘要：
This study develops a two-period dynamic signaling model to examine a firm selling electronic products with price markdowns, where product quality is private information. The firm may use a price guarantee strategy, offering refunds to early buyers if prices drop in the second period. We consider consumer forgetfulness and strategic waiting behavior, finding that the price guarantee strategy, alongside pricing, signals high quality, helping distinguish the high-quality firm from the low-quality one under moderate distraction. High distraction leads both firm types to offer price guarantees, while low distraction leads neither to do so. We also show that the price guarantee option can curb consumer waiting due to quality uncertainty, though its effect on total sales varies with consumer distraction and firm type. We identify conditions under which the price guarantee option benefits both the firm and consumers, and show that the high-quality firm is more inclined to offer price guarantee under quality information asymmetry.
主辦單位：經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院
人文社會科學(xué)處
能源安全與低碳發(fā)展重點實驗室
四川石油天然氣發(fā)展研究中心
